



Guidance for police authorities on the performance monitoring and scrutiny of protective services

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2. INTRODUCTION

Overview of guidance

With an increasing focus on improving the delivery of protective services, the Association of Police Authorities' (APA) Performance Management Policy Group identified a need to develop specific guidance for police authorities on performance monitoring and scrutiny of this area of policing. More specifically, guidance was requested in relation to:

- suggested questions to use to scrutinise force performance against the different strands of protective services;
- suggestions of quantitative data to monitor and qualitative information to consider in monitoring force performance; and
- examples of structures and processes currently being established to assist in their performance management of protective services.

The guidance is by no means comprehensive and it was not intended that the guidance should in any way be prescriptive, rather it should be viewed as providing a starting point for authorities to discuss how they can improve their local performance management arrangements for the delivery protective services.

The scope of this guidance is limited to the specific objectives laid out above. However, throughout the document references are made to other useful material to consider in developing or enhancing authorities' wider performance management processes. Furthermore, in developing this guidance it was quickly recognised that as this area of performance management is yet to be firmly embedded there is a lack of what could be considered 'good practice'. Therefore, the guidance should be considered a 'living' document and will need regular review and updating. It is intended that the more comprehensive guidance for police authorities on performance management that was published in 2006 will be updated in due course, and that this document will be incorporated into the revised wider performance management guidance.

What are protective services?

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) identified¹ that the success of focus on driving down volume crime and other policing issues managed at BCU level (referred to as 'level 1'), and the creation of the a national body to deal with more serious and organised crime, terrorism and other extremist activity operating on a national or international level (referred to as 'level 3') came at a cost of a lack of focus by police authorities and forces on the challenges posed somewhere in the middle. That is, there was a lack of focus on cross-border issues usually arising from the actions of organised criminality that affect more than one BCU and/or force (referred to as 'level 2 policing'). The findings and recommendations in this report then led the Minister of State for Policing to commission HMIC to make an assessment of the capability of forces to address level 2 issues and to make proposals as to how this level 2 gap may be addressed. The resulting report is widely known as 'Closing the gap'.

In developing the methodology for assessing individual force capability and capacity to address level 2 policing issues, the assessment built upon a series of HMIC templates that assessed service provision under seven broad headings:

- Major crime;
- Serious, organised and cross border crime;
- Counter terrorism and extremism;
- Civil contingencies;

¹ HMIC (2005) *Closing the Gap*. London: HMIC

- Critical incidents
- Public order; and
- Strategic roads policing.

Collectively, these seven broad headings then became known as 'protective services'. Protective services therefore include areas of policing that need to be addressed using a cross-force approach (such as counter terrorism and serious and organised crime) and also those that although they may be local in focus, may potentially be delivered more effectively using a collaborative approach (such as major crime). A number of the strands of protective services overlap with others and therefore these need to be considered as a whole as well as individually. Further definitional detail for each of the seven protective services is provided in the individual chapters of this guidance.

Why is there a need for a performance management focus on protective services?

The findings in 'Closing the gap' were stark. No force was assessed as being able to demonstrate that they had reactive capability with *comprehensive* proactive capability for each of the strands of protective services and only 2 of the 43 forces in England and Wales were able to demonstrate that they had reactive capability with *significant* proactive capability to deliver against each of the protective services.

The 'Closing the gap' report made suggestions as to why the delivery of protective services had suffered such neglect. Aside from the well-known and controversial finding that the current structure of the service is not fit for purpose, it was also noted that the success of the national focus on volume crime over the past 15 years and increased efforts at the neighbourhood level have been to a certain extent at the cost of delivery of protective services. Furthermore, the reflection of these priorities in the national performance assessment framework and associated mechanisms for supporting a performance management culture have further led to a lack of focus on public protection issues, particularly at the force level (rather than national level).

It was suggested that the existing performance management framework accommodated conventional outcome measurement that some aspects of protective services lend themselves to, however was not flexible enough to include assessments of readiness and preparedness in relation to public protection which is what was required. It was recognised that the national level and local performance paradigms need to change to accommodate a focus on protection as well as crime control.

What are the national developments?

Following the identification by HMIC of the gap in delivery of protective services, the Government proposed that a number of police forces be merged and an intensive period of work by the Service and Government went into assessing the viability of this. The proposal to merge forces was then abandoned by the Government in the summer of 2006 - although voluntary collaborative approaches to delivery of protective services were (and still are) encouraged.

However, the gap in the delivery of protective services still remained and needed to be urgently addressed. In February 2007 the Minister of State for Policing, Tony McNulty wrote to all Chiefs and Chairs proposing a new strategy for closing the gap in provision of protective services. This letter set out a clear timescale of deliverables required by national partners as well as authorities and forces. One of these deliverables was for authorities and forces to have plans in place and to have significantly reduced the risk of harm of protective services 2009 for areas with high need and 2011 for all areas.

In order to support the Service to make the required improvements to the delivery of protective services, the National Policing Board (including representatives from the Home Office, ACPO, APA, HMIC and NPIA) developed, and are now overseeing a comprehensive programme of work to assist forces and authorities to make improvements in these areas of policing. This programme of work includes:

- Securing a better understanding of the problems in relation to protective services and the relative level of threat across England and Wales by the development of a national protective services analysis tool for authorities and forces to identify high-need areas for each protective service;
- Set out clear expectations of the requirement for service delivery in relation to protective services by working with ACPO to develop 'national minimum threshold standards' for protective services against which HMIC inspections of forces in these areas of policing will be based;
- Promotion of voluntary collaboration between authorities and forces by funding a number of demonstrator sites; and
- Ensuring necessary levers and incentives are in place (e.g., adequate reflection the framework for Assessments of Policing and Community Safety) to overcome barriers to effective collaboration and improving protective service capability.

As mentioned above, one of the key national developments to support improvements in the delivery of protective services is the development of the Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) - the new performance framework for the police, working alone and in partnership. Amongst other things, APACS aims to provide performance assessments of policing and community safety issues in a balanced way which reflects relative seriousness (which had been a criticism of the Police Performance Assessment Framework, the APACS framework's predecessor). From April 2008, APACS will provide the set of indicators that the Home Office will use to monitor and track performance in local areas. It is envisaged that APACS will comprise five headline areas/domains: confidence and satisfaction; promoting safety; tackling crime; serious crime and protection; and organisational management. The serious crime and protection domain of APACS reflects the work of the police and others in preparing for, and dealing with, critical incidents and major events which are infrequent but potentially very harmful and disruptive when they occur. Consequently, this domain of APACS, will be a particularly useful tool for police authorities in monitoring and scrutinising performance against the delivery of protective services. The performance indicators to be included in this domain are reflected in the individual chapters of this guidance.

In addition to the national development mentioned above, as part of the budget round in 2004 ACPO was awarded funding to tackle serious and organised crime. This money was invested in the development of Regional Intelligence Units in each of the ACPO regions to analyse, assess and develop information and intelligence held by forces and others involved in or with a stake in law enforcement. A key element of this work is to build knowledge and understanding of organised crime groups who are committing serious crime, assess the risk they pose and manage effective responses to the threat. The money is also being used to enhance the existing collaborative East Midlands Special Operations Unit so that it may act on the intelligence products from the Regional Intelligence Unit.

In summary, resources resulting from this programme of work that authorities may wish to utilise in carrying out their performance management duties in relation to protective services include: the National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT)², the ACPO minimum standards for delivery of protective services and consequently HMIC's specific grading criteria and the serious crime and protection domain of the performance framework for Assessments of Policing and Community Safety.

² NPSAT is an electronic tool that provides comparative data on indicators of the demand/threat in each of the 43 police forces in England and Wales for serious organised crime, major crime and strategic roads policing. The purpose of the tool is to provide authorities and forces with an indicative view of where demand is highest to supplement their own analysis and to inform discussions that police forces will have with HMIC and the Home Office on how to improve their delivery of protective services.

3. POLICE AUTHORITY ROLE IN PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES

What is the performance management role of the police authority?

The police authority role in performance management goes far wider than simply monitoring performance data – the police authority needs to drive the whole local police planning and performance management cycle. The Police Act 1996 and the Local Government Act 1999 set out the overarching framework of police authority responsibilities in relation to performance management. Specifically, these statutory duties are to:

- Secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police service (section 6, Police Act 1996);
- Achieve continuous improvements in policing performance (section 3, Local Government Act 1999); and
- Obtain the views of local people in policing matters and reflect these views when setting local policing priorities for the force (section 96, Police Act 1996).

In carrying out its legal duties therefore, the police authority needs to ensure that police resources are allocated in a way that reflects relative priority³ and that these resources are being used in the most effective way to achieve desirable results⁴.

The performance management duties of the police authority in relation to the specific areas of police activity that fall under the umbrella of protective services, in many ways, are no different to that for any other areas of policing⁵. As with other areas of policing activity, the police authority should assure itself that either the authority itself, or the force on behalf of the authority has robust processes in place to:

- Ensure that communities and partners are consulted on policing issues related to protective services;
- Ensure robust analysis to identify level of demand is undertaken for each protective service and that the appropriate level of priority is awarded to each of the protective services throughout the planning process;
- Ensure that the appropriate level of resource is allocated to the delivery of each of the protective services; and
- Monitor and scrutinise processes and performance outcomes.

This document does not purport to be a comprehensive guide on all aspects of performance management of protective services; rather, the following chapters focus on the performance monitoring and scrutiny of each of the strands of protective services. However, there is a raft of existing guidance documents that authorities may wish to refer to when considering improvements that need to be made to their wider performance management arrangements. These guidance documents include: APA Community Engagement Guidance (currently being drafted); Police performance management: practical guidance for police authorities; Setting local priorities and assessing performance for PPAF's local policing domain (currently being updated); Counter Terrorism Oversight Framework (currently being drafted) and Home Office guidance on the Police and Justice Act changes to the statutory planning responsibilities of police authorities (currently being drafted).

³ Taking into account community concerns, operational considerations and national priorities.

⁴ For a comprehensive guide to the police authority role in performance management see 'Police performance management: Practical Guidance for Police Authorities'.

⁵ With the exception of the Metropolitan Police Authority, for which there is a duty to ensure the MPS is efficient and effective in discharging its national and international functions.

How does performance management of protective services differ to that for other areas of policing?

It has been illustrated above that much of the police authority role in performance management of this area of policing should be core business and wherever possible streamlined into existing arrangements and processes. However, there are a number of peculiarities to protective services that police authorities need to take into account when considering the best approach to performance management in this area:

- there is a higher level of sensitivity concerning some of the material and authorities may wish to consider what type of information they need from the force to be able to ensure improvements in performance and if there is any need for members or staff to be vetted;
- given the sensitivity of some of the material, the authority will need to give careful consideration to the what is reported to the public and in what context;
- due to the rarity of the occurrence of some incidents the performance management approach of the authority may need to focus more on preparedness and risk management and scrutinising documentation in this vein rather than monitoring trends and comparisons of performance against peers; and
- the collaborative approach to preparation for incidents and responding to incidents that some forces and authorities may take will necessitate a different type of performance management approach (e.g., joint-committees, or more informal committees, to oversee collaborative delivery).

Authorities will wish to consider their local arrangements and processes for performance management of the force and whether or not the performance management of protective services can be adequately incorporated into existing systems or if additional or alternative arrangements are required. Case studies of existing police authority practice are provided in each chapter to assist authorities in these considerations.

Why do police authorities need to have performance management arrangements in place in relation to protective services?

Police authorities have a responsibility to ensure an efficient and effective police service and this duty applies across all policing activities, not least of which includes protective services. The public expect a reasonable level of service from their police force and the police authority needs to ensure this is delivered. Authorities therefore need robust performance management arrangements in place to ensure the right priorities for delivery focus are agreed, be able to evidence improvements in delivery against these and to reassure communities accordingly.

In addition to this generic duty, a number of recent changes to the legislation have placed further duties on police authorities in relation to securing improvements to the delivery of protective services. As noted earlier in this guidance, the Home Office has laid out a programme of deliverables required to achieve improvements in protective services and one of these is for police authorities and forces to have plans in place to start delivering significant improvements in protective services from April 2009 for areas with high need and 2011 for all areas. This requirement will be reflected in the [regulations/guidance] for the new planning requirements under the Police and Justice Act 2006, thereby encouraging authorities to ensure that the normal police authority planning process takes account of the need to improve protective services⁶. Accordingly, in order to demonstrate improvements against their plans for the delivery of protective services, authorities therefore need to have robust performance management mechanisms in place.

⁶ Authorities are reminded that policing plans need to be Equality Impact Assessed before publication.

Furthermore, from [15 March 2008], a new order will come in extending the existing police authority functions to ensure there are arrangements in place for forces to cooperate in the interests of greater efficiency and effectiveness. Consequently, authorities will need to ensure their performance management arrangements for oversight of their force's delivery of protective services take into account cooperative and collaborative efforts with other forces also.

Finally, one of the Home Secretary's strategic priorities for the police service for 2008/9 is to 'work jointly to ensure that adequate capability and capacity exists across England and Wales to deliver effective policing to tackle serious and organised crime and to provide other protective services'. Performance improvements against this priority and the actions that sit under this will be measured through the performance indicators in the framework for Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS). Authorities will therefore need to ensure their policing plans are consistent with this strategic priority and that their performance management arrangements include ongoing monitoring of force performance against the indicators in APACS.

What do police authorities need to consider when reviewing their arrangements for performance management of protective services?

The remaining chapters of the guidance focus on scrutiny questions and data sources to monitor that are relevant to each of the strands of protective services as well as case studies on how authorities are approaching performance scrutiny in this area. However, authorities will wish also to consider whether they have adequate arrangements in place for performance management of protective services as a whole (i.e., across all strands).

In reviewing current arrangements and identifying areas for improvements authorities may wish to consider the following:

- Which protective services are showing as the greatest areas of risk to the force?
- Are members fully sighted of these risks and the protective services improvement plan to address these?
- What are the arrangements the police authority has in place to effectively scrutinise performance against the improvement plan?
- Does the authority have a holistic approach to performance management of the delivery of protective services (ie consultation and priority setting, equalities and community impact assessments of the protective services priorities, through to consideration of resources and performance scrutiny against these)? Are there any gaps? What needs to be put in place to address these gaps?

Examples of how police authorities have recently reviewed and improved their arrangements for performance management of protective services are illustrated in the following case studies.

Improving performance management of protective services: case study examples of current police authority practice

Kent Police Authority

What was the issue?

As part of the business case to the Home Office during Closing the Gap the Kent Police Authority (KPA) set out a detailed programme of how it would raise capacity in protective services to allow it to meet the standard required to become a strategic force. Following the decision to postpone possible force mergers,

the Authority decided to continue with the investment programme in protective services that had previously been accepted by the Home Office, but sought to develop a more rounded solution to what was a multi-faceted problem. The key issues the Authority faced were:

- Unclear governance arrangements for the delivery of protective services investment. Given that the investment amounted to a £2million programme over two years wholly funded through the precept on the council tax, the Authority was clear that it had to be involved at every stage of such a critical aspect of service delivery;
- Limited member understanding of protective services/level 2 policing with an overt focus on level 1 policing at police authority meetings and publications; and
- Few protective service performance indicators/information from which Members could develop their assurance role around protective services.

What course of action was agreed?

To ensure delivery of the joint Force-Authority objectives for protective services the Authority now has members and authority officer representation on the Protective Services Programme Board. The Chair and the Chief Executive sit on the Programme Board with the Chief Constable, and this Board makes all key decisions on the investment programme to increase strength of protective services across the force.

The Authority and Force developed two critical performance indicators and targets in relation to increasing the capacity of protective services: a stringent reduction in abstraction from level 1 to level 2 policing in line with the agreed increase in resource by the Protective Services Programme Board; and an increase in the number of Organised Crime Enterprises dismantled. These indicators are reflected in the local policing plan.

The Authority appointed a Lead Member for each of the protective services with direct link into the relevant Force (officer) lead. Lead members meet Force lead officers at least quarterly to discuss current issues within the protective services. Authority lead members are required to formally report back to the KPA Secretariat for (a) audit purposes and (b) so that the issues raised can be considered as part of the ongoing KPA planning process. An informal group of lead members covering protective services meets bi-monthly to share best practice, discuss current issues across protective services and seek guidance from Authority officers as required and take a holistic view of protective services.

The Authority agreed that protective services performance would not be based on metric crime indicators, but a more sustained 'scrutiny' approach would be required. In this way the threat/strategic assessment for each of the protective services, developed by Specialist Operations Directorate as part of their NIM process, became the principal source of information for Lead Members covering protective services. The Threat/Strategic assessment provides data on performance, intelligence and risk around each protective service, providing Members access to a substantive amount of information on which they can challenge, probe and assure themselves (and the Authority) that Force activity and process are robust, with no significant gaps or unacceptable risks.

As part of a wider approach to incorporating Risk Management into the work of the Authority, the Force Risk Register (including Specialist Operations risk register) has been linked to the Authority forward planning process so that key risks can be flagged to Authority or relevant committee as appropriate.

Challenges to overcome?

Kent Police Authority had not security vetted all of its members which presented a particular challenge as lead members for protective services needed access to the appropriate level of information to discharge their assurance role. The Authority agreed a graduated vetting policy whereby the Chair, Vice Chair and Chief Executive were vetted to the appropriate level to consider Counter Terrorism issues, and other KPA members were vetted to the same level as Police Staff. Concerns around the appropriateness of Kent police officers/staff vetting KPA members led to a reciprocal vetting agreement with Essex Police.

As the area of protective services was not previously considered in any depth as part of normal KPA business many lead officers in Force had little experience of dealing directly with the police authority officers or members, and were unused to the Authority taking a critical interest in their area of business. This challenge was overcome by adopting a Lead Member protocol to set out expectations and requirements on both sides, complemented with briefings from the KPA Chief Executive to Force lead officers to clarify expectations.

There was initial uncertainty between the Specialist Operations Directorate and Area Operations Directorate regarding the timetable for delivery of benefits around reduced abstraction from level 1. This was overcome by agreeing a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the parties setting out the timeline for the delivery of protective services growth (and therefore reduced abstraction) with the Protective Services Programme Board overseeing the SLA and any deviation from the agreement.

There was some initial concern from the Force that as the Authority expanded its interest into an area of the activity not previously considered in any depth would invariably lead to an increased workload/administrative burden on the Force in the preparation of reports and assessments. This was overcome by principally using products, such as the strategic/threat assessment, that were already used within Force as part of the NIM process.

Outcomes and Benefits

As a result of the course of action taken the following positive outcomes have been achieved:

- Clearer Authority understanding of the protective services issues;
- Force understanding/acceptance of Authority oversight/governance role in protective services;
- Protective Services Programme Board governance model rolled out to other areas of Force-Authority business e.g. Neighbourhood Policing Programme Board; and
- Reduced abstractions from level 1 to level 2, further boosting resilience at level 1/neighbourhood policing despite increased demand across Level 2.

Surrey Police Authority

What was the issue?

Surrey Police Authority had identified that there was a gap in its performance management in protective services. As there is significant expenditure in this area of policing and the Authority had also agreed increased investment around major crime but did not really understand performance achieved for the expenditure it was important that the Authority improved its processes for monitoring effectiveness of delivery of protective services.

What course of action was agreed?

The Authority agreed five key actions to improve its performance management of force delivery of protective services as follows:

- To set policing plan targets in relevant protective service/ crime management areas;
- To restructure the authority structure to have a panel with the remit of protective services;
- To train members of the Control of Crime panel in specific areas of protective services to allow a better level of understanding and therefore scrutiny;
- To appoint member champions for specific areas within protective services and a lead policy officer for protective services and provide further training to these leads; and
- To develop a crime management scorecard.

Policing Plan targets:

The main performance management tool used by Surrey Police Authority is the Local Policing Plan. The Authority is closely involved in developing the policing plan and setting out what the force needs to concentrate on and achieve. In addition, targets set in the policing plan are regularly scrutinised by the Authority. The Authority hence firstly made sure that the Local Policing Plan for 2007/8 included priorities and targets in relation to protective services and also plans for how protective services would be managed and improved (major crime, serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism, gun crime, civil contingencies).

The targets in these areas for Surrey Police in 2007/8 were:

- To be the safest county in England and Wales in relation to more serious violence;
- To charge at least 135 people with Class A drug supply;
- To increase the number of asset confiscation orders obtained;
- Disrupt or dismantle 10 criminal enterprises; and
- To ensure a capable level of readiness for terrorism, pandemic, flu and flooding.

Panel Structure:

The second action taken by the Authority was to reorganise its panel structure. In Surrey, the full Authority takes all decisions and reviews all areas of business. To aid decision making, panels or working groups are set up to understand areas of force business in much greater depth than can be achieved with a full authority. At the end of 2006, these panels were restructured to follow the 4 strategic aims of the authority (Customer Satisfaction, Confident Communities, Control of Crime, and Capable and Supported Staff) with an overarching Finance and Performance panel. Previously the performance panel had looked at all aspects of force performance. In the new structure, each panel was tasked with looking at performance in detail for their area with the Finance and Performance Panel keeping an overview of all targets.

The Control of Crime panel hence now looks at all crime issues including volume crime and protective services. This allows for a regular, more in-depth discussion of protective services issues. The policing plan targets, as well as any national targets set in the area of crime and protective services, are scrutinised by this panel at each meeting.

Member and Officer Training:

The Authority also recognised that the area of protective services is a new area for most members. The panel hence has a workplan in place which includes an hour long presentation on an area of protective services at each meeting as a training item for members. Presentations for 2007/8 include: firearms policy; civil contingencies; serious and organised crime; counter-terrorism; and vulnerable people.

Over the year, members of the panel will have gained a more in-depth understanding in these areas, which should allow them to scrutinise the force more effectively in these areas.

Member Champions and Lead Officers:

The Authority has member champions for any area of policing where it is felt that one or two members need to have a much more in-depth understanding. For the Control of Crime panel, the following areas have Member Champions: protective services; vulnerable people; managing crime (to cover volume crime and major crime).

In addition, there is a policy officer lead for crime management and protective services. These members and the lead officer have had further training, including attendance at the force crime management performance review day and one-to-one meetings with force leads.

Scorecard:

Finally, in the area of crime management there is a large amount of management information, however, it is

a complex area and difficult to distil into a few indicators. A scorecard is currently being considered to include a number of high level indicators and budget information for consideration by the Control of Crime panel.

Challenges to overcome?

Gaining a balance in the level of understanding required to effectively scrutinise these areas of policing without being overwhelmed by detail has been difficult. This challenge led to the training programme and the early development of a scorecard.

Another challenge is the requirement to consider value for money in this area of policing. For some parts of crime management/ protective services in Surrey (e.g., fingerprint matches, OBTJs for major crime, asset recovery etc) performance measures can be determined. However, other areas may have data but are very difficult to put a value on e.g. murder investigation timescales, intelligence reports. Still other areas of investment are almost impossible to measure e.g. terrorist incidents prevented, murders prevented, support to victims/ families of very serious incidents.

Finally, a further challenge to performance management in this area is making performance comparisons with other forces. Different forces have different structures e.g. many forces have these functions on division, whereas Surrey has a centralised department and Surrey also had a dedicated major crime investigation team rather than abstracting from divisions.

Outcomes and Benefits

Surrey Police Authority is still developing its improved structures and processes for performance management of protective services so outcomes and benefits are difficult to quantify. However, some early benefits have been:

- Increased member understanding in protective services/ crime management;
- Increased sharing of information between the force and authority; and
- Setting of policing plan targets which has led to an increased force management focus in this area.

Police Authorities of Wales – All Wales Collaboration Programme, Formulating a Protective Service Strategic Assessment to Direct Programme Resources

What was the issue?

The letter from the Minister of State Tony McNulty MP sent in February 2007 set out clear expectations from the Government of Police Authorities and Chief Officers in relation to the Police Reform and Protective Services agenda and, in particular the need to improve delivery of protective services.

What course of action was agreed?

Police Authorities of Wales (PAW) was established to be a representative body of the four Police Authorities in Wales. PAW is a Joint Committee constituted by the Police Authorities under the Local Government Act 1972. This governance arrangement supports collaborative working across the principality, as members of PAW are empowered to ratify proposals relating to the provision of joint police services and facilities. As part of its constitution PAW gave a commitment to prepare an overarching policing plan for Wales which supports Chief Constable plans and provides the strategic direction for the collaborative programme.

PAW developed a Strategic Assessment of Protective Services Capability and Capacity for 2007. The assessment concentrated on the changes and proposed changes to the delivery of protective services through collaborative approaches. It also influences the next stages of the programme of collaboration to ensure that the police forces of Wales continue to work to bridge the gaps identified by HMIC. Following the production of the Strategic Assessment a programme of work was identified and

commissioned through the PAW “Agenda for Change”.

The PAW policing plan for Wales is currently being produced and takes into consideration the Strategic Assessment of Protective Services and the Agenda for Change document. This National Plan for Wales once adopted will inform the collaboration element of Forces Local Policing Plans.

Challenges

One of the key challenges in preparing the Strategic Assessment for 2007 was the initial engagement of all forces. As a strategic assessment had been completed in 2006, the team experienced some difficulty initially in selling the benefit of updating the assessment. This was overcome by appointing a strategic lead at ACPO level to champion this key element of work.

Although Forces across Wales knew what their own level 2 gaps were, there was little sharing of information with neighbouring forces to establish what impact such gaps were having on other forces. This proved to be a significant challenge to the team as each force was required to undertake individual level 2 assessments to feed into the All Wales Strategic Assessment. The ACPO lead proved to be highly influential in encouraging each force to undertake individual assessments.

One of the main challenges to any collaboration programme is the continued commitment of all parties. The Governance arrangement surrounding the programme ensures that a firm foundation is in place for decision-making and joint agreement of programme goals and objectives.

Outcomes

As a result of the first Strategic Assessment a programme of work has been identified and commissioned through the PAW “Agenda for Change” programme blueprint. This allowed the Wales Collaboration Programme to focus on areas of greatest threat and risk. The key advantage of taking this approach was that it enabled forces and authorities to prioritise areas for action and develop a timetabled implementation plan. The assessment allowed for a substantial degree of judgement to be used by senior professionals, which led to public protection being added to the list of issues which needed to be tackled early on. The Strategic Assessment was the key basis for agreement between forces, authorities and HMIC on which protective services were of higher demand in Wales.

In addition to themes identified by the Strategic Assessment, work has been undertaken on various specialist aspects of support to local policing, as well as more general business support areas. This is in line with the ‘policing in the round’ philosophy endorsed by the Police Authorities and Chief Constables.

The Home Office and HMIC have cited the All Wales Strategic Assessment for Protective Services as best practice as no other region has adopted this approach in identifying the level 2 gap.

4. POLICE AUTHORITY SCRUTINY OF FORCE DELIVERY AGAINST EACH OF THE PROTECTIVE SERVICES STRANDS

As outlined in Chapter 3, police authorities need to consider scrutinising force performance in relation to any policing activity across a number of areas, such as community engagement, priority setting, equalities implications of force policy, resource allocation and monitoring of outcomes. Whilst respecting that it is not by any means a comprehensive or exhaustive list, police authorities may wish to consider the following questions in scrutinising force performance against each of the strands of protective services:

- What is the level of threat for the protective service and what evidence is this based on (e.g., NPSAT, force assessment, HMIC etc)?
- How is the force reducing the level of threat for this protective service?
- What resources are required for reducing this threat?
- Is there a strategic risk register for this area of policing and how is it monitored? Should any of these risks be owned by the police authority?
- How is the force engaging with the public in relation to this area of policing? What are communities' primary concerns?
- What measures are in place to inform the public about activity to deliver effective protective services?
- What is the potential level of harm for differing communities and how is this assessed?
- What measures are being put in place to negate any adverse impacts on specific communities?
- What are the key priorities for the force in this area and how are these reflected in BCU and departmental plans?
- What proportion of the force budget is allocated to this area of policing? What is the actual spend against the budget? What resources is this being spent on?
- How is the force ensuring there is equality of opportunity for posts to deliver this protective service?
- Who are the key partners the force needs to work with in tackling this area of policing and what are the arrangements for partnership working?
- What support is the force providing to regional and national initiatives and what measures are in place to ensure this support will be provided?
- Are there opportunities for collaborative working with other forces on this area of policing? How is the effectiveness of collaborative working being assessed?
- What indicators should be developed/ used to monitor performance against the priorities identified in the protective services section of the policing plan? How is the force performing against those areas covered in the protective services section of the policing plan?

In addition to the general scrutiny questions detailed above, the chapters on individual strands of protective services also detail more specific questions to consider, as well as providing suggestions of data sources to monitor and case study examples of current police authority practice.

The remaining chapters present definitions, specific scrutiny questions and data to monitor on:

- Serious and organised crime, with a case study from Greater Manchester police authority on setting up a panel to scrutinise policing activity in relation to serious and organised crime and counter terrorism (Chapter 5);
- Strategic roads policing, with a case study from West Yorkshire police authority on the Yorkshire and the Humber joint-committee approach to managing the risks associated with strategic roads policing (Chapter 6); and
- Major crime, including a case study from Thames Valley police authority on improving existing processes to include a performance management focus on major crime (Chapter 7).

5. SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME

Introduction

Although there are a number of definitions of what constitutes serious and organised crime, tackling serious and organised crime is mainly concerned with deterring, disrupting or dismantling serious, organised or cross-border crime, prioritising that which causes significant physical, social or economic harm to individuals or communities. What constitutes serious and organised crime therefore is likely to differ in scope from force to force. However, organised criminals have been defined as: “Those involved, normally working with others, in continuing serious criminal activities for substantial profit, whether based in the UK or elsewhere”. The types of activity widely agreed as being undertaken by organised criminal groups include drug related crime, human trafficking, gun related crime, serious violent and life threatening crime and financial crime.

The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was established to make an impact on serious organised crime that affects the UK so that harm that it causes is reduced. In addition, SOCA is tasked to support law enforcement partners such as UK police forces and HM Revenue and Customs. SOCA is primarily concerned with Level 3 crime.

Police activity in tackling serious and organised crime is therefore mainly focused at level 2 and just below, i.e. cross border issues affecting more than one Basic Command Unit (BCU) and potentially across boundaries into neighbouring forces and level 3, at a national or international scale.

Specific scrutiny questions in relation to serious and organised crime

In addition to the generic scrutiny questions as suggested in Chapter 4, authorities may wish to consider the following questions specifically in relation to serious and organised crime:

- Does the force have a structured plan for engaging with and gathering and assessing intelligence from the community in relation to serious and organised crime?
- Is there a communication strategy in place to inform partners and the public about serious organised crime incidents and operations?
- What level of threat does serious and organised crime represent for the force and how has this been assessed?
- How is serious and organised crime reflected in force priorities?
- Does the force have sufficient resources/access to resources to meet the estimated level of threat?
- What contingency plans are in place to meet an extraordinary level of demand should it arise? What resources will this require?
- How is the force sharing intelligence with other forces and partners? What effective outcomes has this led to?
- How is the force performing against any specific policing plan objectives and targets in relation to serious organised crime?
- How effective have force strategies to reduce the level of serious organised crime and the level of threat been?
- What are the lessons that have been learnt from post-operation reviews and how are these being shared?
- Have effective community and equalities impact assessments been conducted (for each operation)?

Potential performance indicators to monitor

Indicator type	Indicator description
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Indicator type	Indicator description
APACS performance indicators (still to be finalised)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of serious acquisitive crimes per 1,000 popn • Number of cash-in-transit robberies per 1,000 popn • Re-offending rate of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) Category 1 Offenders (Registered Sexual Offenders – RSOs) who are being managed at Levels 1, 2 and 3 (and associated KDIs) • Ratio of assets recovered per 1,000 popn (and associated KDIs) • Number of most serious violent crimes per 1,000 popn • Percentage of serious sexual violent crime offences brought to justice • Number of recorded life threatening gun crime offences per 1,000 popn • The number of level 2 organised criminal groups – as identified in the 2007/08 ACPO mapping exercise – operation in a police force area which the force has disrupted
National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Life threatening and Gun crime incidents • Cash in transit robberies • Problematic user drug estimates • Unlawful use of firearms • Blackmail offences
Other potential indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of joint operations between the force and SOCA • Number of joint operations between the force and Customs and Excise • Number of opportunities for asset confiscation against number of referrals • Trafficking in controlled drugs per 1,000 population • Level 2 drugs (number of seizures, weight, value) • Number of recorded firearms discharges • Number of robberies of financial institutions • Number of suspicious activity reports (SARs) • Abstractions to perform specialist operations
Qualitative data sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post-operation reports from force: description of activity and outcomes, problems and successes of an operation and impact on performance of other areas of business
Areas for development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People trafficking • Sex offender management • Witness protection

Useful reference material and resources

ACPO Threshold Standards for Protective Services
 HMIC Serious and Organised Crime inspection: Specific Grading Criteria
 One Step Ahead, a 21st Century Strategy to defeat Organised Crime, 2004
 National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT)
 UK Threat Assessment for Serious and Organised Crime (SOCA)
 HMIC thematic report: Payback Time
 Force strategic risk register

Force risk-based assessments of the levels of threat capability and capacity to identify improvements needed in the protective services

Case study: establishing a serious and organised crime and counter terrorism scrutiny panel in Greater Manchester Police Authority

What was the issue?

One of the priorities for Greater Manchester Police in 2007-2008 is “To take the lead in protecting our communities from widespread threats, serious and organised crime, terrorism and extremism”. Serious and organised crime therefore is a key issue for the force and the Authority needed to ensure it had effective performance management structures in place.

What course of action was agreed?

As part of a recent review, the Authority took the opportunity to examine its committee and panel structures to ensure performance management arrangements were in place for all key areas of service delivery. As a result, the Authority established a serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism scrutiny panel. The membership of this panel includes the Chair of the Authority, the Vice Chair and one other member. The panel meets quarterly to scrutinise and ensure authority oversight of force delivery of serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism. The Chief Officer responsible for counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime and the commanders of the Serious Crime Division and Counter Terrorism Unit attend panel.

The type and nature of the information considered by the panel include:

- Relevant statistics;
- Threat assessment;
- Relevant HMIC Inspection reports;
- Performance against the priorities specified within business plans;
- Consideration of resource levels; and
- Consideration of financial issues not appropriate to be dealt with through the normal financial oversight mechanisms of the Police Authority.

The Authority also requests operational briefings from the force which include a description of significant operations currently underway or carried out since the last panel meeting. These briefings contain sufficient detail to allow members of the panel to understand the threat faced within the force area and actions taken to minimise or disrupt the threat and bring offenders to justice. Operational briefings specifically include relevant information on community impact assessments and consequence management.

Challenges to overcome?

One of the challenges the Authority needed to overcome was to agree what information was needed to be shared with the panel, the level of sensitivity of this information and the measures to take to ensure security and confidentiality of this information. It was agreed that for the panel to be able to operate effectively police authority members and officer supporting the panel needed to be subject to security clearance vetting. It was agreed furthermore that Section 5 of the 1989 Official Secrets Act should apply to the members and officers of the panel. On appointment to the panel, all Police Authority members and officers have the relevant section of the Official Secrets Act 1989, explained to them and at the start of every panel meeting, all present are formally reminded of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1989. Arrangements have also been made to ensure the security and confidentiality of any submitted papers or reports for the panel to consider.

Outcomes and Benefits

The Panel enables the Police Authority to provide effective oversight and scrutiny of an area of policing

activity that was not previously scrutinised through the formal committee structure. As a result the Authority will be much better sighted on aspects of serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism activity and more involved in other forms of performance management of this area of policing (e.g., HMIC inspection).

6. STRATEGIC ROADS POLICING

Introduction

Roads policing is a service that can (and must) be provided at all levels, from the Neighbourhood to Strategic (including cross-border), and in partnership with Highways Agencies and local authorities. The definition applied by HMIC Denis O'Connor is 'A service that protects the national road infrastructure from threats posed by terrorism, disrupts criminals using the roads, confronts anti-social behaviour, and makes our roads safer and accessible for users, reducing the risk of death and injury'. The identification and separation of the police resources, activities and outcomes associated with Strategic Roads Policing therefore poses significant challenges.

The current ACPO Roads Policing Strategy identifies the following objectives:

- Denying the criminals use of the road by enforcing the law;
- Reducing road casualties;
- Tackling the threat of terrorism;
- Reducing anti-social use of vehicles; and
- Enhancing public confidence and reassurance by patrolling the roads.

It is important for police authorities to reach agreement as to what constitutes Strategic Roads Policing within their local context in order to ensure its efficient and effective delivery. In practice, it is necessary to determine whether attention is confined to policing of 'strategic roads' (ie motorways and trunk roads – possibly through a specialist unit or team) or whether it is about strategically policing all roads. In order to apply the broader definition, and separate level 2 from level 1 policing, it will be necessary to identify usage of specialist resources and assets.

Specific scrutiny questions in relation to strategic roads policing

In addition to the generic scrutiny questions suggested in Chapter 4, authorities may wish to consider the following questions specifically in relation to strategic roads policing:

- What is the communications strategy around informing the public of overt operations and/or major incidents on the roads?
- Have effective equality impact assessments been carried out on the force's strategic roads policing policies (e.g., the impact of Gypsy Travellers and the differences in driving cultures and approaches to road safety of new and emerging communities)?
- Is there explicit reference to strategic roads policing (as opposed to roads policing) in the policing plan? (i.e., is the focus on tackling level 2 criminality as opposed to/in addition to casualty reduction etc)
- Do NIM intelligence products regarding the criminal use of the roads inform, direct and prioritise resources towards targets on the YATH roads network with particular reference to strategic roads?
- What is the capacity, capability and distribution of ANPR across the force/region?
- What is the role of the Highways agency and other partners in reducing the threats in relation to strategic roads policing? How is the force working with partners?
- What is the level of 'double hatting' of specialist roads policing officers and staff and risks associated with this?
- How is the force reducing the level of threat for the area of strategic roads policing?

Potential performance indicators to monitor

Indicator type	Indicator description
APACS performance indicators (still to be finalised)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage of arrests resulting from Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) hits as a proportion of all arrests • Number of ANPR systems compliant with ACPO standards developed jointly with partnerships by type: a) fixed site; b) mobile; c) portable; d) CCTV • Number of RIPA authorities for covert ANPR deployments for investigation/intelligence gathering purposes • Number of joint ANPR operations with other forces and external agencies such as immigration, HM Revenue and Customs, VOSA, DVLA
HMIC assessment of Force performance against the agreed national standard.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grade and direction of travel
Other potential indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggravated theft of a motor vehicle • Sanction detection rate for dangerous driving • Police pursuits involving damage/injury as a percentage of all pursuits • The proportion of breath tests following collisions which show positive (Roads Policing Strategy) • Data from speeding monitoring devices such as those at safety camera sites (Roads Policing Strategy)

Useful reference material and resources

ACPO Threshold Standards for Protective Services

Force risk register

HMIC Strategic Roads Policing Inspection – Specific Grading Criteria

ACPO and Department of Transport Roads Policing Strategy 2005

Home Office Thematic Review of the Use of ANPR within police forces (Dec 2006)

HMIC assessment of force performance against the agreed national standard

Force risk-based assessments of the levels of threat capability and capacity to identify improvements needed in the protective services

Case Study: Managing the Risks associated with Strategic Roads Policing in Yorkshire and the Humber region

What was the issue?

When confronted with the challenges presented by 'Closing the Gap', the four police authorities within Yorkshire and Humberside came together to explore new governance arrangements to support joint working across and deliver improved policing outcomes across the region.

What course of action was agreed?

The four police authorities agreed to form a statutory joint committee and, through this, support the Chief Constable's plans to commission project work to look at joint working opportunities in respect of two protective service areas, one of which was Strategic Roads Policing.

In addition to receiving update reports and being presented with interim and final recommendations, the joint committee nominated a link member to engage directly with the project, receiving briefings directly from the project director. The role of the link member was to bring an authority perspective to the project and to report back to the joint committee on the direction and progress of work.

Challenges

Some difficulties regarding access to information were initially encountered. Link member access to both documents and project team meetings was restricted at first, through a misunderstanding on the part of the project as to the purpose and nature of the link member role. Once this had been resolved, link members felt much better able to both influence the direction of projects and to reassure their colleagues about the quality of the work being undertaken.

Whilst the project sought to design an 'ideal' model of collaboration, work was still needed to quantify the resources used and outcomes obtained from the current configuration so the costs (and/or savings) and benefits of the new arrangements could be assessed. This work involved a separate exercise, known as micro-analysis. Detailed work was done within each of the forces to identify the resources currently employed in each protective service area, including Strategic Roads Policing. This included vehicles, equipment and other assets as well as numbers of police officers and staff – both whole posts and where Strategic Roads Policing activities formed only part of a role.

A parallel strand of work looked at the threat posed for Strategic Roads Policing within each force. Once the nature and extent of the threat could be put alongside the resources available it was possible to identify gaps, and therefore areas of risk. Scoring then indicated where most remedial action was required.

Outcomes

Bringing these assessments together for the region as a whole provides the joint committee with a much sounder platform for priority decision-making. These assessments also provide a benchmark to link resource utilisation to the achievement of goals and objectives – information that is fundamental to effective oversight and governance.

The micro-analysis was complex, resource intensive and relied to a degree on subjective judgement. For the first time, however, forces and authorities within the region have a clearer picture of what resources are being applied, for what purpose and to what effect. By comparing that to the risks they face, both within and between protective services, they are able to allocate resources on a more rational basis and monitor the application of those resources in a more systematic manner.

7. MAJOR CRIME

Introduction

Major crime includes the most serious categories of crime; homicide, stranger rape and abduction. The focus is on force wide, regional and national activity (level 2 and 3). This is crime which individual local police areas will generally not have the resources, specialist knowledge or community intelligence for detection or prevention. HMIC defines major crime (in its specific grading criteria for inspection of major crime) as any crime that would normally require a force to set up a major incident room, and any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist resources. The use of specialist resources will normally be at force level under the leadership of the ACPO team, with links to national agencies such as SOCA. In some forces there is a focus on domestic extremism.

With specific reference to major crime, the HMIC report 'Narrowing the Gap' identified the need for greater understanding of relationships between crimes with the major crime category, such as:

- take account of a range of offences under the broad headings of homicide and serious sex offences;
- understand through community intelligence the risk of major crime from offences such as domestic violence; and
- establish proactive preventative measures as part of the overall control strategy.

Performance Scrutiny Questions

In addition to the generic scrutiny questions suggested in Chapter 4, authorities may wish to consider scrutinising force performance in relation to unplanned incidents of major crime and planned operations, and asking the following questions:

- How many investigations and operations have there been since the last meeting?
- For each investigation/operation:
 - What was the budget allocated and what was the actual expenditure?
 - What was the staffing allocation and what were the levels of abstraction from BCU and Specialist departments to support this investigation?
 - What collaborative working was involved (i.e., with partners, other forces) and how effective was this?
 - What were the outcomes of the investigation/operation? Can we measure the success of the investigations against force priorities?
 - What are the lessons to be learned (problems/successes) and how have these been shared with partners/other forces involved?
 - What and how was the impact of the incident on the local community assessed, in terms of potential and actual harm and community cohesion?

Potential performance indicators to monitor

Indicator type	Indicator description
<p>APACS statutory performance indicators (still to be finalised)</p> <p>Also see the associated key diagnostic indicators underlying these</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of most serious violent crimes per 1,000 popn • Number of recorded serious violent knife crime offences per 1,000 popn • Number of domestic violence homicide offences per 1,000 popn • Percentage of serious violent crime offences brought to justice • Number of recorded life threatening gun crime per 1,000 popn • Percentage of serious sexual crime offences brought to justice • Number of serious acquisitive crimes per 1,000 popn • Proportion of domestic violence related offences that result in an arrest • Percentage of victims of domestic violence victims managed by a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) who are subject to a repeat incident of domestic violence, where violence has occurred within 12 months of a case coming to the MARAC • Re-offending rate of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) Category 1 Offenders (Registered Sexual Offenders – RSOs) who are being managed at Levels 1, 2 and 3)
<p>Other Potential Indicators</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of abductions per 1,000 population • % of abduction crimes detected/convicted • Number of attempted murders per 1,000 population • % of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted • Number of blackmail crimes per 1,000 population • % of blackmail crimes detected/convicted • Number of kidnappings per 1,000 population • % of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted • Number of manslaughters per 1,000 population • % of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted • Number of murders per 1,000 population • % of murder crimes detected/convicted • Number of rapes per 1,000 population • % of rape crimes detected/convicted • Number of homicides per 1,000 population • Senior Investigation Officers involvement in each type of incident (homicides, sex offences and abduction) • Sanction detections by category (homicides, sex offences and abduction) • Cost of major operations in a financial year • Abstractions from each BCU to major crime

Useful reference material and resources

ACPO threshold standards covering murders, the administration of major incident rooms, House to House investigations and DNA mass screening.

MIRSAP Manual - Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures

HMIC major crime inspection 2007/8 specific grading criteria

HMIC Protocol - Inspection Protocol for Major Investigations (2000)

Force risk register

Force risk-based assessments of the levels of threat capability and capacity to identify improvements needed in the protective services

Case study: improving Thames Valley Police Authority's existing performance management arrangements in relation to major crime

What was the issue?

Thames Valley Police Authority had existing structures and processes in place for monitoring force performance against policing plan targets, expenditure and resources (e.g., sickness data and performance development reviews). The Authority also had protocols in place for monitoring how the Force engaged with local communities and delivered against local priorities. These structures and processes have been developed and improved over recent years and now include a number of local boards and local area committees that review performance.

However, in 2006/7 the Authority recognised that significant areas of expenditure were not being monitored - particularly headquarters support functions, including protective services - and that it was necessary for the Authority to review its processes to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of force activity in these areas.

What course of action was agreed?

The Authority agreed to monitor protective services, operational command units (such as criminal justice) and key work streams (such as neighbourhood policing) through its full authority committee and a programme of reviews was agreed. Whilst this programme of work is subject to on-going review as part of the Authority's risk management approach, it was agreed that each area would be subject to focused review of performance at least once a year. The Authority's review of major crime performance was covered as part of its review of 'Crime Support' in June 2007. In Thames Valley 'Crime Support' includes the following departments: Specialist Operations; Force Intelligence; Force Crime Management Unit; Major Crime Team; Review Team (undetected major crime); and Forensic Science.

The Major Crime Team supports police areas by investigating the most serious categories of crime (homicide (categories A&B), stranger rape, kidnap etc). The Team's focus is on level 2 activity (including regional issues) and also level 3, providing links to national agencies (e.g., SOCA). The Major Crime Team is responsible for supporting the Force's Control Strategy, including the key themes of:

- BCS crime reduction;
- Public reassurance (neighbourhood policing);
- Reducing harm caused by class A drugs;
- Identifying organised crime enterprises;
- Managing violent offenders; and
- Reducing the threat from terrorism and extremism.

Challenges

It was necessary to determine what success in relation to major crime looked like and to ensure a common approach to performance scrutiny of major crime with that for other protective services, operational command units and key work streams. The Authority agreed that the performance data should be reviewed in relation to inputs, outputs and outcomes and that variation between BCUs, trends over time, comparison of force structures with other forces and collaboration efforts should be considered.

The Authority therefore requested the following data in relation to the resources assigned to major crime:

- Resources – Sickness, PDRs completed and budget (actual and outturn);
- Tasking Bids – Resources bid for from major crime by each BCU; and
- Basic details of major operations in 2006/7.

To determine the outputs achieved with these resources, the Authority reviewed the following performance data:

- Conversion rates from forensic investigations;
- Financial Investigations;
- Abstractions from BCU to major crime (department set up to reduce these abstractions);
- SIO involvement in incidents by type and BCU; and
- Sex offender multi-agency protection arrangements by BCU.

The Authority also reviewed performance against policing plan and force risk management plan objectives, such as:

- Deterring terrorist activity or disrupting terrorist networks;
- Ensuring an adequate level of resource to deal with major crime incidents;
- Identifying trends in homicide and critical incidents;
- Effective policing response to kidnaps;
- Disrupting organised criminal networks;
- Shut down cannabis factories;
- Increasing ANPR capability;
- Development of Public Protection Units;
- Victim care training (specifically around serious sexual assaults); and
- Development of an integrated homicide reduction strategy.

Outcomes

Thames Valley Police Authority's revised approach to performance scrutiny of headquarters support functions has allowed the Authority to hold the Chief Constable to account in a public meeting for delivering policing services in relation to major crime - an area of policing activity associated with a significant level of expenditure - that was not previously robustly scrutinised by the Authority. The improvements to the existing performance management structures and processes will ensure the Authority is more informed of performance issues in relation to major crime when agreeing priorities and assessing risk as part of the 2008/9 planning and budget setting process.