

**REPORT FOR DEVON AND
CORNWALL POLICE AUTHORITY**

**REVIEW OF THE JOB EVALUATION
PROJECT**

(including recommendations)

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1. Background to the Review

- 1.1 The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary (the Constabulary) completed a job evaluation project for its Police staff in April 2005. In excess of 500 job roles were identified and evaluated. The outcome was that a large number of Police staff were to be re-graded and salary scales were to be changed from April 2005 resulting in some staff being paid more and others would have been receiving, in some cases, significant salary cuts. Some staff would have stayed on their current salary.
- 1.2 The original intention had been to 'protect' the salaries of those staff subject to a reduction until October 2006. As a result of the adverse and high profile reaction by many Police staff to the outcome of the job evaluation project it was agreed that all those staff that would have seen a reduction in salary would remain on their current salary until such time as they leave their current post.
- 1.3 The Review was instigated by the Police Authority as a result of concerns about the project and its outcomes.
- 1.4 Separately, an independent Review of the Job Evaluation Scheme that the Constabulary used for the project was commissioned by a joint management/union working group of the Constabulary and was undertaken by ACAS. That Review was about identifying the issues that need to be taken into account in implementing any future job evaluation.
- 1.5 An investigation into the conduct of those employees involved with the job evaluation project also was commissioned by the Deputy Chief Constable.
- 1.6 The Police Authority Review was designed to review all associated aspects of the job evaluation project to determine how the project apparently went wrong to the point where staff reacted as they did and what lessons might be learned as a result. It was not within the remit of the Review to investigate individual culpability or failure.
- 1.7 The terms of reference of the Review recognise that the job evaluation scheme *per se* does not form part of this Review. The objective was to review all the associated managerial, relationship, leadership and organisational issues leading up to the severe disruption following the announcement of the result of the project and to make recommendations for the future. A detailed set of areas for review was discussed initially but it was agreed that the following 'headline' Terms of Reference should be adopted:
 - i. **to audit and identify the principal deficiencies in the processes and procedures, including leadership and management, adopted and applied in the job evaluation exercise and the associated development of a revised pay structure.**

- ii. **to report on the reasons for the deficiencies and make recommendations as to how similar exercises should be handled in the future.**

- 1.8 The Local Government Employers (formerly the Employers Organisation for Local Government) was asked to undertake this Review and I was appointed in May 2005 to lead the work. Chris Schofield, an independent consultant (who *inter alia* advises the Police Authority - but not the Constabulary - on human relations matters) assisted with the Review. This Executive Summary provides some contextual information for the Review and sets out the Conclusions and Recommendations in full.
- 1.9 The Review Team would like to place on record its appreciation of the contribution to its work by the staff of Operation Marlow and the Devon and Cornwall Police Authority. Thanks are due also to all those interviewed as part of the Review for their time and their candour.

2. The Review process

- 2.1 Work on the Review started in June 2005 and in its initial stage the Review focused on reading and absorbing the huge amount of written material initially provided to the Review Team.
- 2.2 Further documentation was requested by the Team to assist its work and a programme of individual interviews with those personnel who were involved in various ways with the job evaluation process was undertaken. An enormous amount of additional documentation was provided through Operation Marlow (established as a Data Collection Exercise by the Constabulary as a result of the problems with the project).
- 2.3 Relevant source documentation was also provided by the Police Authority including the Baseline Assessment by the HMI in October 2005.
- 2.4 The depth of concern among staff and the external interest in the Review was clear from the outset. Because of this it was crucial to be sure that the findings and conclusions in relation to the terms of reference could be sustained. It was necessary to look at the job evaluation project as a whole, including its inception and the process followed as well as its conclusion.

3. Job evaluation

- 3.1 Job evaluation is a method of looking at all the jobs in an organisation against a common set of criteria ('factors') to enable consistent judgements to be made about the 'size' of each job relative to every other job in the organisation.
- 3.2 There are various ways of doing this but the 'Job Evaluation Scheme' adopted by the Constabulary for this exercise was a variant on the local government scheme agreed nationally by unions and employers through the Police Support Staff Council (PSSC). This scheme was, like the local government scheme, developed as a paper-based scheme (in other words the job analysis for each job was achieved through the completion of a job analysis form which captured the necessary information about the job and which was then used by a Job Evaluation Panel to 'score' the job in the context of the 'factors' and 'levels' used for that scheme). Subsequently, again like the local government scheme, a computer tool was developed to enable the job analysis to be conducted by a facilitator and the resultant information 'scored' electronically without the need for a Panel. The advantage of this is that it saves time and reduces the potential for inconsistency in scoring which can occur when (as is almost inevitable in a large scale job evaluation exercise such as this) membership of the Panels vary. Job evaluation is systematic but it does have an element of subjectivity, which the computerised tool should help to reduce. However, it is essential to realise that the computerised approach (in this case the Gauge software) is not the 'Scheme'. In this case the 'Scheme' remained that approved by the PSSC
- 3.3 In the case of what the Constabulary refers to as the Job Evaluation Project, the Project Initiation Document (PID) as finalised in 2004 makes it clear that the outcome was to be:

'a Review of the pay structure for consideration and approval for adoption by the Force Strategic Board. This Review to include options for revising the pay and grading structure, which will also seek to address the various organisational, social and labour market imperatives'.

It was assumed from the start that the Project would encompass all three stages:

- job evaluation
 - grading structure
 - £: Points
- 3.4 This is an important point to note, as the principal focus in practice appears to have been on the first stage, with much of the work on the two latter stages receiving relatively little or virtually no attention or investment.

- 3.5 The outcome of a job evaluation project and its associated exercises is, therefore, potentially fundamental change to the relationship between the organisation and its employees and between employees. There are inevitably ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and this has to be recognised by both management and by employees (and their representatives) at the outset. A test for the successful outcome of a job evaluation and pay restructuring project is not just whether it achieves whatever objectives management had set before the process started, but also whether it was managed in a way that the majority of employees saw as ‘fair’ even if some were disappointed in the outcome.
- 3.6 The outcome of this job evaluation project did not meet that test. The fact that the outcome of the project was not acceptable to top management in the Constabulary, to the Police Authority, to some in management and certainly to many Police staff should not be taken as an indication that it was either misconceived or that it was not capable of producing an acceptable outcome. As explained above, job evaluation is a tool to support the review of pay and grading structures and the introduction of new structures. There is no axiom that such pay and grading reviews will produce outcomes whereby everyone is a ‘winner’. However if, inevitably there are going to be ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’ it is important that there is confidence that the project has been managed as effectively and fairly as possible. What has been identified by the Review is that some of the deficiencies in the way that the project was managed undermined that confidence while other deficiencies contributed to an outcome that was plainly unacceptable.
- 3.7 There is no one single factor or person to which or to whom responsibility for the outcome of the project can be ascribed. That is not to say that mistakes (of either omission and/or commission) or errors of judgement were not made by individuals or groups of individuals, or that there was not poor management. Some of the decisions and actions taken, particularly towards the end of the process, were evidently flawed and may of themselves have been sufficient to generate the reaction that the outcome received from Police staff. However, such decisions and actions also need to be set in the context of actions taken or not taken at a much earlier stage that, to some extent, undermined trust in the exercise among some of those working on the project. This contributed to a climate in which some Police staff were sceptical about the outcome even before it was announced on 20th April 2005.
- 3.8 The Review considered in detail the following facets of the Project culminating in an examination of the leadership and management issues:
- **‘The understanding in the Constabulary about job evaluation’**
 - **‘Structuring and resourcing the project’**
 - **‘Project management’**
 - **‘Quality assurance’**
 - **‘Developing the pay model and structure’**

- **‘Risk assessment’**
- **‘Management and staff ‘buy in’’**
- **‘Trade union negotiations’**
- **‘Financial imperatives’**
- **‘The decision-making process’**
- **‘The role of the Police Authority’**
- **‘Leadership and management’**

Although this Executive Summary does not provide full details of the Review’s findings about these facets the Conclusions and Recommendations that resulted from the Review are summarised in Sections 5 and 6 respectively,

3.9 The Terms of Reference for the Review specified an assessment of the organisation leadership and management issues and the next Section provides a summary of such issues arising from the Review that had significant organisational implications over and above job evaluation considerations.

4 Leadership and management

- 4.1 Leadership and management shortcomings existed at a number of levels. None of them were individually fatal to the job evaluation project, but cumulatively, when taken on top of the inadequate technical and professional knowledge and expertise in job evaluation and pay and reward issues, they contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome to the project.
- 4.2 The organisational impact of the project was understood by too few key people. To many managers at all levels the project appears to have been seen as a technical exercise best left to the 'experts'. Unfortunately there was a dearth of expertise particularly in job evaluation and in the design of pay structures.
- 4.3 On the other hand, there was strong organisational financial expertise and there no doubt that financial imperatives overshadowed human resources considerations.
- 4.4 In addition, among key players at all levels, certain outcomes were 'expected' in the sense that there was a view that some jobs were probably 'over-graded' - therefore, some 'losers' were expected. Some preconceptions of outcomes in a project of this nature are inevitable but, if those preconceptions are not to become self-fulfilling prophecies, openness to challenge is critical as is ensuring that those who have responsibility to challenge have access to or their attention drawn to key information. In some circumstances withholding knowledge may increase the ability to drive a project to a conclusion within time frames that have been set, but if it means that the outcome is not sufficiently 'tested' what is finally delivered may not, as in this case, be acceptable.
- 4.5 Furthermore, when knowledge was shared it was not shared as effectively as it might have been and certainly there does not seem to have been sufficient appreciation among managers at all levels in the Constabulary that this was a major organisational change, There was also a lack of apparent understanding that such change should be something that happens 'with' rather than 'to' people.
- 4.6 There seems generally to have been a reluctance to hear 'bad news'. to receive challenge or to listen to warning bells. It is not clear whether this is a feature of the Constabulary's culture generally or whether it was particularly strong in this particular project, but in a recent 'baseline assessment' the HMIC commented on the perception within the Constabulary that 'bad news' is not welcome at the top.
- 4.7 Some concerns raised by staff were acknowledged, but these seem to have been more about process than outcomes. Leadership in a managerial context requires taking staff and colleagues with you, understanding and weighing up opinions and contributions other than your own and being prepared to admit that others might be right. line. It seems that such leadership was not always present.

- 4.8 Against this, it is clear that there is a ‘can do’ culture in the Constabulary and that what happened in this project reflected this. This goes to the heart of the management and leadership ‘paradox’ in the Constabulary. There was a determination to deliver, but where there were voices of concern or dissent they were not given sufficient weight. There was a lack of expertise in the subject and there was insufficient clarity about what had to be delivered and who would make what decisions. The project was on a ‘treadmill’, which no one seems to have tried hard enough to get off.
- 4.9 It is not necessary for all management decisions to be made either at the ‘top’ or in the ‘centre’. Many organisations are very clear, in a way that does not seem to have been the case in the Constabulary, about those matters on which they are going to be ‘tight’ in respect of decision-making powers and those on which they are going to be ‘loose’. They are also clear about who has the authority to make decisions and, therefore, responsibility for their outcomes. Effective decision making is not just about the quality of decision-making but also requires clarity about who is going to take decisions, discipline on the part of those not empowered to take particular decisions to follow the decision-making framework (even if that is frustrating) and a preparedness on the part of those who have management responsibility to ensure that they take decisions. In these respects in the case of this project leadership and management were poor.
- 4.10 The consequence was that by the end of the project a major change was effectively being driven by an ‘unaccountable’ group of senior middle managers whose activities were not being managed effectively by the relevant senior managers to whom they reported as part of their normal activities. Established management norms for the project were not followed as assiduously as they should have been, which is surprising in a disciplined service such as the Constabulary. Risk assessment procedures were not followed. Some key players evidently found the project management process frustrating and looked for opportunities to cut corners. That is acceptable providing the outcome is also robust and defensible. In the event this was not the case and shows clearly the need to adhere more consistently to the checks in the project management process.
- 4.11 The Constabulary will need to consider whether all ‘projects’ should be handled automatically through the Prince methodology and, where this methodology is used, how projects are monitored and potential outcomes challenged.
- 4.12 The following Section summarises the conclusions reached by the Review Team.

5 Conclusions

5.1 The Review highlighted a number of organisational issues such as the lack of capacity within the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary to undertake a project of this specialised nature and the errors of omission or commission that occurred at many levels in the organisation. Despite this, the job evaluation project was delivered. There is no doubt about the commitment and effort put into the project by a number of key players, most of whom had ‘day jobs’ to keep going at the same time. The Review did not undervalue that commitment nor was it unduly critical of those who spent so much time and effort on the project. The key issue as already indicated above seems to have been that the project was over-dominated by a ‘*can do*’ approach that, while no doubt essential in many of the situations in which the key players find themselves, was not necessarily appropriate at all times in this instance.

- It is clear that the job evaluation project initiated by the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary had serious shortcomings in terms of its concept, its inception, its objectives, the management arrangements and the outcome.
- The ‘roots’ of some of the problems that became apparent in April 2005 can be identified at the point when the project was first conceived and initiated in 2002
- The project was supposed to be a ‘pay and reward’ project – the job evaluation element was only a tool to achieve the planned outcomes. This does not seem to have been appreciated by many of those involved.
- There was no intrinsic fault with the job evaluation approach adopted but the Constabulary only a limited understanding and knowledge that the software system it bought was underpinned by a job evaluation scheme.
- The training of the staff that acted as facilitators was inadequate and the result was unreliable job evaluation outcomes. This was only realised when all the evaluations had been completed in the autumn of 2004.
- The Project was under-resourced with a number of key players having to do their normal duties as well as devoting considerable time to the project.
- The pay model was developed before the job evaluation element of the project was sufficiently complete and does not seem to have been underpinned by an agreed Pay and Reward strategy.
- It appears that some of the checks and balances that normally apply in a job evaluation project were not in place early enough or at all.

- Members of the Project Board (which had been set up in accordance with Constabulary practice to oversee the job evaluation project) were also too involved in detail in the later stages of the project, thereby limiting the capacity of the Project Board to stand back from the process and independently judge its strengths and weaknesses.
- Last minute adjustments to the results of the job evaluation by a small sub-group of the Project Board were regarded with great suspicion and antagonism by the staff.
- The project management arrangements that were put in place appear not to have complied with the usual methodology used by the Constabulary. In particular there was no regular risk assessment in place.
- It appears there was a lack of interest involvement and attention from senior management to the project, its progress and, particularly, its implications – despite its potential impact on 40 % of the workforce.
- Staff expectations about the outcome were unrealistically high and the communication arrangements did little to dampen them.
- The budget allocated for implementing the outcome of the project was insufficient compared with the normal provision for such exercises in other organisations.
- The imperative of keeping the outcome within the budget provision overrode all other considerations. Financial considerations dominated the determination of the final ‘£: points’ relationship that was developed without sufficient reference to more senior management for approval.
- The timescales set were too ambitious and not sufficiently flexible to allow for proper scrutiny by senior management.
- There was a lack of effective engagement by senior police officer management generally and by those responsible for the governance of the project in particular.
- There was a lack of clarity and consistency about by whom and in what forums decisions would be made about the outcome of the project.
- The quality of decision-making was poor. Written reports on the proposed outcome and the decisions to be made were not prepared or circulated in advance to the meetings that considered the outcome of the project. Nor was any comprehensive Impact Assessment given to or requested by senior managers at these meetings.
- There was a lack of appropriate trade union involvement in the project.

- There was a serious mismatch of perception of the outcome by those who designed the pay scheme – who saw the staff as ‘winners’ (largely through the effect of ‘contribution’ pay) – and the staff themselves who considered themselves as overall ‘losers’. Consequently there was a propensity for ‘good news’ messages to be given when they were not necessarily justified.
- Challenges to and notes of caution about management of the project and its possible outcomes seem to have been met at best with indifference and at worst with hostility.
- There was inadequate research into market pay and no recognition of the part market supplements might play in the final proposals in both alleviating some of the ‘losses’ and ensuring that the Constabulary would be able to recruit and retain staff in areas where there is a market premium.
- The Devon and Cornwall Police Authority was not sufficiently or appropriately engaged in the project despite being ultimately accountable for the finances of the Constabulary and as employer of the staff involved.
- This project (and it appears other Human Resources projects) was not helped by the lack of continuity or professional human resources expertise in the management of the human resources function by ACPO and Chief Superintendent personnel.

5.2 Since April 2005 there has never been any doubt that there were serious problems with this project, not least in the light of the reaction of the staff directly affected by the outcome. The Review initiated by the Police Authority indicated that the project was poorly conceived and managed with insufficient investment from the start (particularly in respect of training and communication) and with a lack of effective governance throughout. The end result was an embarrassing reaction to the outcome by Police. Hopefully, this Review and its recommendations summarised in the next Section will help the Constabulary and the Police Authority to learn lessons about what went wrong with the project and that these lessons will ensure that major projects like this are executed more effectively in the future.

6 Recommendations

The approach to job evaluation by the Constabulary

- In any future job evaluation project the Constabulary should ensure that it has access to and makes effective use of human resources expertise in both job evaluation and the development and design of pay structures;
- In any future job evaluation project the Constabulary should ensure that whatever scheme is used is 'fit for purpose' and that 'best practice' is followed in piloting the scheme, developing 'conventions' and establishing mechanisms for 'sorethumbing' the outcome;

Structuring and resourcing projects

- In any future project the Constabulary should ensure that an effective communication process is put in place to ensure that all managers and staff are aware of the scope of the project, the methodology and possible outcomes;
- In any future project the Constabulary should ensure that those actively involved in the project are effectively trained and equipped to undertake the tasks that they are required to perform;
- In any future project there should be clarity at the outset about the extent and scope of the project and the objectives that it is intended it should achieve;
- In any future project the remit of any Project Board or Steering Group should be clearly defined and the trade unions should be represented on that Board/Group;
- In any future project it should be clearly defined what aspects of the development of the outcome will be within joint machinery with the trade unions and what, in the first instance, will be a matter for management to develop;
- In any future project the Constabulary should ensure that the level of resources (both financial and human) allocated is sufficient to meet the likely requirements of the project;
- In any future project the Constabulary should endeavour to ensure continuity of membership of any Project Board or Steering Group and, as far as is reasonably practicable, ensure that those who are managing the project are not doing so as part of an 'add-on' to existing duties.

Project management

- The appropriateness of the Prince methodology for a project of this nature should be reviewed;
- In any event the parameters of a future job evaluation and pay exercise should be clearly defined so that there is no doubt what methodology is going to be used to for the various elements of a comprehensive review of pay and grading [It may be that the actual development of a pay strategy and structure will better be handled outside Prince methodology given that it will require negotiation with trade unions at a senior management level];
- Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the principles of the methodology are properly adhered to for those parts of any project that are established in accordance with the methodology;
- Given the significance of any future job evaluation project, while ownership should not reside in one person, the project should be led actively by a member of the Constabulary Executive, who should, if appropriate chair any Project Board;
- If the Prince methodology is to be used the Chairs of Project Boards and other key players should be effectively trained in the methodology;
- Effective arrangements should be put in place to update senior managers on both progress and issues arising during a future project;
- The Constabulary (managers and Police staff) must recognise that while target dates may be set for the completion of any exercise, flexibility may be required;

Quality assurance

- In any future job evaluation project, the 'sorethumbing' process, rationale and 'trails' for audit purposes must be clarified at the outset;
- The communication process must include raising awareness that 'sorethumbing' is an integral part of the job evaluation process, but that 'lobbying' by individual managers, staff or the trade unions on behalf on specific jobs or groups of jobs undermines the integrity of the process.

Developing the pay model and structure

- That a Pay and Reward Strategy is prepared for consideration and approval by the Police Authority;
- That such a strategy needs to underpin the development of future reward structures which may include the development of new pay structures following further job evaluation and review of associated allowances and benefits;
- In any future job evaluation project there must be confidence that the 'stack', even though it may not be complete, is broadly 'fit for purpose' before detailed pay modelling take place;
- It must be recognised by the Authority and by management and staff in the Constabulary that, given the overall constraints imposed on the Authority and the Constabulary, additional budgetary provision to deliver a Pay and Reward Strategy may be limited and that alternative sources of funding, including reductions in 'headcount' and ending 'legacy' allowances, may be required;
- If the Pay and Reward Strategy is to include any 'contribution', 'competence' or performance' pay, the Constabulary must ensure that effective procedures and processes are in place to underpin this, that managers and staff are trained in them and that effective procedures are in place to monitor outcomes;
- There should be clarity about what aspects of implementing any Pay and Reward Strategy need to be negotiated and what may be matters for consultation;
- If, as part of that Pay and Reward Strategy, it is necessary for the Constabulary to pay market supplements, these should be determined by reference to benchmark research and implemented as apart of the new pay structure;
- There must be clarity about where authority lies within the Constabulary to approve any new pay structure and the role of the Police Authority within that approvals process, recognising that on those matters that require negotiation it may be necessary to gain approval to negotiating options;
- As part of any approvals process comprehensive written Impact Assessments covering both the effect on staff and the impact on budget need to be prepared.

Risk assessment

- That the risk assessment procedures incorporated in the Prince methodology should be adhered to in so far as any future exercise is established using that methodology;
- That if the 'Prince' project management methodology is not used in any future job evaluation project appropriate risk awareness mechanisms are identified and monitored;
- As part of any approvals process there should be comprehensive Impact Assessment covering both the effect on staff and the impact on budget;

Management and staff 'buy in'

- In any future job evaluation project an effective communication (as opposed to marketing) strategy should be put in place to ensure that all managers and staff are aware of the scope of the project, the methodology and possible outcomes;
- While recognising that there will be aspects of any future exercise, particularly matters such as negotiating strategies with the trade unions, that should reasonably remain confidential, the Constabulary should strive to achieve openness in the process with both staff and managers;
- It must be recognised and accepted that openness of communication requires that 'bad news' as well as 'good news' about the implications, progress and consequences of any future exercise should be shared with staff and managers at all levels. It must also be clearly recognised by Police staff and managers that job evaluation is a major organisational change in which there will be 'winners' and 'losers';
- Given the high level of feeling and suspicion generated by the job evaluation project on which this Review has focused, particular attention should be given to ensuring that Police staff understand and accept the outcome of any future project, irrespective of the impact on them as individuals;
- The Executive as a whole should demonstrate to the Constabulary its commitment to and understanding of the significance such exercises even though management of major cross-cutting exercises may be the responsibility of a particular member of the Constabulary Executive;
- Consideration should be given to how in any future job evaluation project the correct balance is achieved between consultation through the accredited trade unions and other approaches to communication and consultation if the current relatively low level of Union membership continues;

Trade union negotiations

- In any future job evaluation project the role and responsibilities of the trade unions should be clearly defined;
- In any future job evaluation project trade union representatives should receive appropriate training and reasonable time off to fulfil their role(s)
- In any future job evaluation project the trade unions should be represented on any Project Board/Steering Group, recognising that there may be aspects of the exercise that are to be the subject of negotiation and/or consultation with the Trade Unions (e.g. the development of pay structures) and which may, therefore, fall outside the remit of such a Project Board/Steering Group;
- In any future job evaluation project job evaluation project there be clarity at the outset about those matters which are to be for negotiation and those which are to be for consultation;
- The formal and informal negotiation and consultation machinery for Police staff should be reviewed to ensure that it is both fit for purpose and understood by the parties;

Financial imperatives

- The Authority should determine, in the context of the Pay and Reward Strategy and its Medium Term Financial Strategy, how much it considers appropriate to set aside within as possible 'new' budget provision for any future job evaluation project;
- In any future job evaluation project the Chief Constable and the Authority should consider alternative sources of funding outcomes (including organisational review) that meet in full or in part the objectives set out in the Pay and Reward Strategy but which cannot be contained financially within any 'new' budget provision that may be made available;
- Financial assumptions and implications should be included in all Impact Assessments prepared during any future job evaluation project particularly those prepared prior to approval within the Constabulary and by the Police Authority;
- The level of financial awareness and expertise among non-finance middle and senior managers within the Constabulary should be reviewed and consideration should be given to how it should be developed to enhance the effectiveness of financial management;

The decision-making process

- In any future project it needs to be established at the outset which decisions relating both to the management of the project and to its outcomes are the responsibility of the Project Board/Steering Group, the Programme Executive, the Constabulary Executive, the Chief Constable and the Police Authority;
- The key management (as opposed to operational) decision making procedures in respect of Human Resource management within the Constabulary should be reviewed and, without impeding the need for flexibility in specific circumstances, codified to enhance clarity about authority and responsibility;
- Consideration should be given to whether such a review would also be appropriate in other management areas of the Constabulary;
- The Chief Constable and, where appropriate, the Police Authority should identify key impact assessment information necessary to enhance the quality of decision making (e.g. financial appraisal, organisational impact, diversity implications) and ensure that these are incorporated into the papers for strategic and other significant management decision making processes.

The role of the Police Authority

- The Authority should review the role and function of its Human Resources Committee and, in conjunction with the Chief Constable, determine what matters relating to human resource management within the Constabulary it should be required to approve prior to implementation;
- Irrespective of the outcome of this general review the role, contribution and decision making responsibilities of the Police Authority in any future project be defined at the start of the exercise and appropriate mechanisms established to ensure that the Authority can fulfil its responsibilities;
- The Authority should review its overall mechanisms for scrutinising the effectiveness of the management of the Constabulary;
- The Authority should consider whether it should have access to its own independent human resources advice and how that advice could most effectively support the Authority and the Constabulary;

- The Authority should, with the Chief Constable, review how and to what extent it should be represented on Project Boards and Steering Groups within the Constabulary, including the rationale for and role of such representatives and what mechanisms might be put in place to highlight or raise matters of potential concern;
- In addition to formally approving any Pay and Reward Strategy and its subsequent application, the Authority should, as part of its scrutiny function, monitor both the progress and outcomes of any future job evaluation or pay exercise;
- As part of the review of the joint negotiation and consultation machinery for police staff, the role of the Authority should be considered;
- The Authority should ensure that, when being asked to take decisions of major significance, comprehensive papers are prepared and circulated in advance and that reliance is not placed solely on presentations. Such papers should include key impact assessment information.

Leadership and management

- The role, purpose and responsibilities within the Constabulary's management arrangements for Command Team meetings, Force Executive, Force Strategic Board and Programme Boards should be reviewed and clarified;
- The decision-making protocols and policies of the Constabulary should be reviewed so as to ensure clarity about responsibility and accountability (be it individual or collective) for major projects, strategies and other significant management decisions together with consistency in the application of those protocols and policies;
- Building on the above, consideration should be given as to how the Constabulary might best engender corporate ownership at all relevant levels of 'cross cutting' issues and major change projects, while recognising that leadership of particular projects/initiatives/portfolios might rest with a particular member of the Constabulary Executive;
- Consideration should be given about steps that might be taken to increase the confidence of both Police officers and Police staff within the Constabulary, firstly to bring forward matters that might be perceived to have negative connotations (e.g. what has been termed 'bad news stories') and secondly, to challenge more senior managers without concern for recrimination where reasonable challenge is beneficial to the outcome;
- Consideration should be given to measures that could give confidence to Police staff that they are 'valued' by the Authority and by the Constabulary;